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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

NRO Review Completed as Redacted.

COVERAGE OF

BORDER FROM

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for National Security Affairs
(Via Mr. Peter Jessup)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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BYE 2580-64

28 APR 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Special Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Coverage of
Targets from [redacted]

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1. The attached document is a proposal for U-2
reconnaissance of [redacted] Targets in [redacted]

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2. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That approval be given for one additional U-2
mission for photographic coverage of [redacted]
Targets in [redacted]

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b. That the contingency plan herein be approved.

SIGNED
BROCKWAY MCMILLAN
Director
(S) National Reconnaissance Office

Attachment - 1
Proposal Book

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I. JUSTIFICATION

This plan is in response to the requirements outlined in USIB D-41.14/91, "Review of Long Range Reconnaissance Program for the Far East", and current COMOR targets for the [redacted] border.

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There exist three targets (see map) slightly deeper into the [redacted] than those adjacent to the border. They are considered to be junctions on the logistic routes which might support hostile actions by the [redacted] against [redacted]. It is against these three targets principally that this mission is proposed.

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II. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The IDEALIST Detachment at [Redacted] will
accomplish photographic coverage of certain [Redacted]
border targets beyond the immediate border area. These
targets (depicted on the attached graphics) require one
successful mission, in addition to those already approved,
for full coverage of the target requirements. Other [Redacted]
[Redacted] border targets will also be covered on the entry
and exit routes.

This mission will be flown from [Redacted] without the
need for using a forward staging area.

A United States pilot will be utilized and the U-2
will be unmarked except for the minimum necessary
identification to support the approved cover/contingency
plan.

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III. AIR DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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In [] near and North of the [] border
the [] have a few Early Warning Radar Sites. In
late 1962, this limited capability was moved into the
[] area and near the [] area.

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A limited and sporadic Early Warning tracking capability
exists in the area into which the missions aircraft must
fly to accomplish the required coverage. There is no
known or suspected Ground Control Intercept or fighter
capability in this area.

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does occur is an occasional late afternoon thunderstorm.

At [redacted] afternoon temperatures average 102° F and have been observed at 118° F. At night the mean temperature falls to 80° F but due to the high moisture content of the air it is still very uncomfortable. The climate is much hotter than any similar coastal location in the United States.

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
V. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR U-2 OPERATIONS FROM [redacted]

A. General:

1. The proposed cover and contingency plans for U-2 operations out of [redacted] have not been completed in detail, nor approved as yet by the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee or the [redacted]. With proper security safeguards at [redacted] and with the cooperation of the host government in suppressing news media coverage or comment, it is anticipated that operations can be conducted for a prolonged period before any significant exposure occurs.

2. It must be assumed that at some point, even in the absence of an incident, that speculative and possible documented reports will appear in the press (probably [redacted]) concerning the presence and mission of U-2's in [redacted]. In response to queries on this subject it is believed that denial would be hazardous and that "no comment" would be tantamount to admission.

A preferable alternative would be to confirm that U-2's are engaged in aerial mapping surveys along the [redacted] border and that additional details (including base) are of a classified



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nature. The Government, at their option can confirm the United States' statement or refuse comment which in effect will be interpreted as confirmation.

3. The sole spokesman for the U. S. Government on this subject will be the State Department and in no instance will any statement be made until it has been reviewed and approved by the ICPC and If necessary, the pilot will be identified as a Lockheed civilian employee.

B. Loss of Aircraft in Hostile Territory:

If an aircraft is lost in hostile territory (regardless of where with reference to depth of penetration) and it is subsequently necessary to make a public statement, it is proposed that we adhere to the story that the aircraft was engaged in aerial mapping surveys of the border. If the contend that the incident occurred deep in their territory we can challenge the accuracy and veracity of the charge. There is, in reality, little or no evidence they can offer as to actual site of the incident which could not have been fabricated. As in all other instances, the State Department alone will speak for the United States Government and only after coordination with the ICPC

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C. Instructions to the Pilot:

1. The pilot will be instructed that in the event his aircraft comes down in hostile territory and he is captured, he will conduct himself in accordance with the provisions of Operations Policy set forth in [Redacted] 3265, formerly Operations Policy Letter No. 6, which states in substance that he will give only the following information:

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- a. Name
- b. Date and place of birth
- c. Address in the United States
- d. CIA affiliation (civilian)

2. He will maintain, as long as possible, the contention that his mission was an aerial mapping survey of the border and surveillance of roads in proximity thereto. If the incident occurs at a point which would appear to be wholly inconsistent with such a mission, the pilot will be permitted to offer the explanation (e.g. navigational error, equipment malfunction, hypoxia, etc.) that he considers most plausible under the existing circumstances.

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